1.
Peirce’s Logic ^
- professional discussions between solicitor or barrister and client (mode: spoken; functions: e.g. exposition, advice, sympathy; formality: neutral/formal);
- professional discussions between legal practitioners among themselves (mode; spoken; functions: various; formality: usually neutral or informal, maybe formal between junior and senior);
- judge giving judgment in court (mode: spoken or written-to-be-spoken; functions: information, exposition, possibly literary; formality: formal);
- advocate pleading in court (mode: spoken; functions: persuasion, exposition, possibly flattery, provocation, etc.; formality: neutral/formal);
- legislation (mode: written; functions: regulation of conduct, injunction, archaism, etc.; formality: very formal) (Weston 1991: 14–15)
2.
Holmes and Peirce ^
The concept and the external sign of the semiotics of law has no Peircean roots. Peirce, a polymath scientist, was no lawyer, but had in 1892 jurists-friends in the Metaphysical Club, who organized intellectual meetings in Cambridge, Massachusetts. The informal discussion group brought together Peirce and Judge Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., the famous forefather of American law, later Judge of the Supreme Court of the United States (Fisch 1986a: xxix ff., Fisch 1986b; Menand 2001) in the company of William James, John Dewey, and other young thinkers of American thought. After the Civil War, Judge Holmes’ legal theory aimed to provide a general view of the common law, offering a pragmatic account of criminal punishment and civil liability (Millar 1975, Valauri 1991). In his efforts to redact the new proposal in his main oeuvre, The Common Law (1881; see Holmes 1963), Holmes was probably influenced by Peirce’s standards of the 1870s, when Peirce wrote the celebrated articles «The Fixation of Belief» (CP: 5.358–5.387) and «How To Make Our Ideas Clear» (CP: 5.388–5.410; see Fisch 1986a: xxix–xxxvii). Whereas Peirce’s standards go back to the underlying properties of the subject’s behavior and then grow into the duty and obligation to the community, Holmes’ legal rules are equally public (not private) and external (not internal) habits of obeying the law in everyday lives. The shifting senses of fundamental terms in our real world correspond to the changes of the moral elements of legal acts which eventually tend to develop some order out of the «chaos» of legal behavior. This evolutionary change, advocated by Holmes, is the touchstone of the later jurisprudence in common law, agreeing with ideas from Peircean semiotics. The legal community makes contact with social reality, but also distorts reality by the good or evil circumstances of the legal action (on reality and human «reality,» see Gorlée 2004: 146, 224–225 fn. 1).
- The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience. The felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions of public policy, avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices which judges share with their fellow-men, have had a good deal more to do than the syllogism in determing the rules by which men should be governed. (Holmes 1881: I, 35, qtd. in Schwartz 1993: 191)
3.
Semio-Legal Logic and Truth ^
4.
Modes of Reasoning ^
Rule All the beans from this bag are white.
Case These beans are from this bag.
• Result These beans are white. (CP: 2.623)
Rule These beans are from this bag.
Case These beans are white.
• Result All the beans from this bag are white. (CP: 2.623)
5.
Abductive Beliefs ^
Rule All the beans from this bag are white.
Case These beans are white.
• Result These beans are from this bag. (CP: 2.623)
6.
Abductive Sign-Action ^
- A judge, let us suppose, has brought before him a case in which a man has suffered injury for which he claims damages of another. Whether damages ought to be paid in such a case is often, as we know, a delicate and puzzling question. We will follow Professor Mezes in using a much too simple illustration, which ought to puzzle nobody. «Take,» he says, «the case where A’s cattle break out of their enclosure, in spite of A’s having used all the care he reasonably could have used, or learned to use, and could learn to use, and destroy B’s valuable crop in an adjoining field.» This case (or rather another far more difficult) puzzles the judge, and he takes it under advisement. He naturally looks into the works on ethics, and, finding nothing pertinent in modern books, is driven to the scholastic treatises. Now, there is nothing in the whole scholastic logic more justly an object of derision for any modern thinker than its weak confusion of thought in its doctrine of causes; not in that whole doctrine is there any more manifest absurdity than the distinction between a proximate and a remote cause. When we meet with an application of it in the scholastic commentary on the Sentences, it stands out as so much more nonsensical than the rest as to be comical; but that anybody should be made to suffer because of any consequence of such metaphysical jargon is outrageous flippancy. Yet it is just this outrage that the judge is driven to commit, or to pretend to commit, because the ethical writers have not expounded right and wrong in a sufficiently luminous and reasonable form.
- Professor Mezes follows them. He maintains that A, the owner of the cattle, ought to reimburse B for the injury one by them to his crop, because A is the proximate cause of B’s suffering. If he would not follow the decisions of Texas courts as the ultimate evidence concerning right and wrong; he could not fail to see that the real reason why the judge awards damages to B is that to allow a private person to undertake a business humanly sure in the long run to injure his neighbors (and all the more so if he «cannot learn to use» suitable preventive measures), and then allow him to pocket all the profits, and make his neighbors pay for incidental losses, would be to bring himself and his court into public contempt and into no little danger. That was the judge’s real reason. But in days gone by (perhaps not yet in Texas) if a judge could decide a case justly, and yet by a process of metaphysical reasoning the less intelligible the better, he was regarded with awe by the vulgar; and that was one motive for his seizing upon that argument when he could get no modern light. (CTN: 3: 51–52)
- There are occasions when the dynamical interpretant – that is, the actually occurring interpretant – of a sign which is the law is not definitely identifiable because the law is too vague in the relevant respect: the facts of the case may be clear enough but the meaning of the law is not, and the judge must, as we say, exercise real judgment in the matter (which is to say that the judge must recognize something as being the relevant dynamical interpretant without benefit of recourse to any ascertainable basis in the immediate interpretant that would justify that recognition). The conscientious judge makes a guess, in effect, at what the final interpretant includes when he or she recognizes something as being a dynamical interpretant of that law at that time relative to that case. But it is the course of future legal interpretation of that law (in courts of appeal, in future juridical practice, and so on) that will determine whether the judge was or was not right in his or her attempt to anticipate the relevant content of the final interpretant – or, as we would ordinarily say, in the attempt to set a precedent that will be honored. (Ransdell 1986: 682–683)
7.
Judicial Decisions ^
- Many commands, orders or warrants are issued directly to one person. The decision in a court case binds the immediate parties – two people, sometimes more – and a small circle of officials who may have to help carry it out. The indirect message, of course, runs to a wider group. Orders, warrants, and commands are usually less important than more general messages – doctrines, laws, principles, or rules. (Friedman 1977: 58)
- Anyone who in ordinary life interpreted words literally, being indifferent to what the speaker or writer meant, would be regarded as a pedant, a mischief-maker or an idiot. One practical reason for the literal rule is that judges are now deeply afraid of being accused of making political judgments at variance with the purpose of Parliament when it passes the Act. (Williams 1982: 105).
- … were recognized in four kinds of judgments: first the cogative, of and by reflection and logomancy; second, aleatory, of and by the dice; third, intuitive, of and by feeling or «hunching;» and fourth, asisine, of and by an ass; and in that same youthful, scornful way I regarded the last three as only variants of each other, the results of processes all alien to good judges. (Hutcheson 1929: 275–276)
- … tiptoe faculty of the mind which can feel and follow a hunch which makes not only the best gamblers, the best detectives, the best lawyers, the best judges, the materials of whose trades are the most chancey because most human, and, the results of whose activities are for the same reason the most subject to uncertainty and the best attained by approximation, but it is that same faculty which has guided and will continue to open hidden doors. (Hutcheson 1929: 179)
- To begin with a trivial one: it is probably correct that the judge can select any factors he wishes and determining the characterization of the fact situation … A more plausible interpretation of this thesis would construe it as asserting that there are no grounds upon which a given characterization may be criticized in other words, that there is no sense in which a particular classification could be termed «correct» or «incorrect,» «reasonable» or «unreasonable.» (Wasserstrom 1961: 33)
- First, under such procedures there should be certain independent criteria by which the one who makes a decision can evaluate the conclusion reached or the course of action decided upon. … The second, and perhaps more significant, requirement is that the justification for any proposal should be submitted to and should be able to withstand public examination. … The third requirement … stipulates that all the grounds or reasons for the decision be both revealed and evaluated. (Wasserstrom 19671: 94)
- Courts not only reach decisions; they expound them, and the exposition must state justifying reasons. … Exposition implies that a definitive solution is reached, that the situation is now determinate with respect to its legal implication. Its purpose is to set forth grounds for the decision reached so that it will not appear as an arbitrary dictum, and so that it will indicate a rule for dealing with similar cases in the future. It is highly probable that the need of justifying to others conclusions reached and decisions made has been the chief cause of the origin and development of logical operations in the precise sense; of abstraction, generalization, regard for consistency of implications. It is quite conceivable that if no one had ever had to account to others for his decisions, logical operations would have developed, but men would use exclusively methods of inarticulate intuition and impression, feeling; so that only after considerable experience in accounting for their decisions to others who demanded a reason, or exculpation, and were not satisfied till they got it, did men begin to give an account to themselves of the process of reaching a conclusion in a justified way. However this may be, it is certain that in judicial decisions the only alternative to arbitrary data, accepted by the parties to a controversy only because of the authority of prestige of the judge, is a rational statement which formulates grounds and exposes connecting or logical links. (Dewey 1924: 24 after Wasserstrom 1961: 95, see also Merrell 1994: 577, 624–626 and passim)
- … suggest ways of minimizing the human factor, minimizing discretion, and maximizing «ruledness» or «legalism.» The emphasis is on professionalism, logic, strict rules, sharp distinctions, positive law, and «hard «cases (meaning, not as it has come to means, cases that are difficult, but cases that reach hard results, showing that head and heart are firmly separated); on abstracting from the specific circumstances of a case, from the tug of emotion, and from the personalities of the disputants. (Posner 1988: 107)
8.
Abductive Flashes and Glimpses ^
- When we study law we are not studying a mystery but a well known profession. We are studying what we shall want in order to appear before judges, or to advise people in such a way as to keep them out of court. The reason why it is a profession, why people will pay lawyers to argue for them or to advise them, is that in societies like ours the commance of the public force is intrusted to the judges in certain cases, and the whole power of the state will be put forth, if necessary, to carry out their judgments and decrees. People want to know under what circumstances and how far they will run the risk of coming against what is much stronger than themselves, and hence it becomes a business to find out when this danger is to be feared. The Object of our study, then, is prediction, the prediction of the incidence of the public force through the instrumentality of the courts. (Holmes 1897: 457)
9.
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Dinda L. Gorlée is a semiotician and translation critic with research interests in legal philosophy of language and interarts studies. Former Visiting Professor of the University of Helsinki, Innsbruck, and Vienna, Gorlée directs a multilingual Legal Translation Agency in The Hague (The Netherlands). She is associate editor of American Book Review at University of Houston, Victoria, TX (USA) and research associate of Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Bergen (Norway). Gorlée recently published Wittgenstein and Translation: Exploring Semiotic Signatures (Berlin: De Gruyter Mouton, 2012).
This article was first published in 2005 at the University of Tartu (Sign Systems Studies 33 (2): 239-272). This version is a modified and corrected edition.